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   The growing concern about the cost-effectiveness of social regulations has spurred Senators Fred Thompson and Carl
Levin to introduce legislation requiring federal regulatory agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of every regulation with an
annual economic impact greater than $100 million.  But while this legislation appears to be a step in the right direction, it fails
to address an issue that is even more important than the balancing of regulatory costs and benefits. 
  The fundamental economic criteria for evaluating any public policy is whether it maximizes social net benefits.  Given
that social regulations are, in principle, designed to reduce welfare losses caused by externalities or threats to human health and
safety, the first step for regulators is to know whether the (alleged) market failure is sufficiently costly to justify government
intervention and whether a proposed regulation is the most efficient way to correct the market failure.
  The paper studies the regulatory battle over airplane noise to illustrate how addressing these questions can improve
regulatory policy by targeting government action where it is needed. The 1990 Airport Noise and Capacity Act (ANCA) mandated
the elimination of certain (Stage II) aircraft at all U.S. airports by the end of 1999. The ANCA therefore affected aircraft design
and generated benefits to homeowners who live in areas affected by airplane noise, but it has also generated costs to airlines by
reducing the economic life of their capital stock.  Surprisingly, analysts have not addressed the basic question of whether the
benefits of the ANCA, arguably the most important piece of airplane noise regulation to date, exceed its costs.  Our own cost-
benefit analysis of the ANCA finds that its $5 billion (present discounted value) in benefits fall considerably short of its $10
billion costs. 
 More fundamentally, we find that the net benefits that could have been generated even by an economically optimal
airplane noise tax amount to only $0.2 billion (present value).  Just as the ANCA has done, an optimal noise policy would transfer
wealth from airlines and travelers to homeowners—although to a much smaller extent.  It appears that current FAA noise
regulations have generated substantial costs to society when, in fact, there was little justification on efficiency grounds for any
regulatory intervention in the first place.  A solid analytical foundation for social regulation will preclude criticism of its cost-
effectiveness.  For example, the Boeing 707 is a Stage I aircraft, the Boeing 727 and DC-9 are Stage II aircraft, and the
1
Boeing 767 is a Stage III aircraft.
 See Federal Aviation Administration (1992a).  Airports do not have the authority to regulate noise without the
2
approval of the FAA.  Only a handful of airports have noise regulations that specify the noise level of planes.
Introduction
           Since the turn of the century, and increasingly of late, the U.S. government has engaged in social regulation aimed at
controlling externalities—spillovers from ordinary business activity—that compromise or imperil human health and safety.
Today, the typical targets of social regulation include pharmaceuticals, workplace safety, product safety, and discharges of
pollution.  But such regulations have recently come under attack as being excessively costly.  Economists estimate that social
regulations cost U.S. firms and consumers roughly $200 billion a year while appearing to produce benefits nowhere near that
(Hahn and Litan (1997)).
   The growing concern about the cost-effectiveness of social regulations has spurred Senators Fred Thompson and Carl
Levin to introduce legislation requiring federal regulatory agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of every regulation with an
annual economic impact greater than $100 million.  But while this legislation appears to be a step in the right direction, it fails
to address an issue that is even more important than the balancing of regulatory costs and benefits. 
  The fundamental economic criteria for evaluating any public policy is whether it maximizes social net benefits.  Given
that social regulations are, in principle, designed to reduce welfare losses caused by externalities or threats to human health and
safety, the first step for regulators is to know whether the (alleged) market failure is sufficiently costly to justify government
intervention and whether a proposed regulation is the most efficient way to correct the market failure.
  The regulatory battle over airplane noise illustrates how addressing these questions can improve regulatory policy by
targeting government action where it is needed.  After decades of public complaints and legal battles over the noise created by
airplane engines, in 1969 Congress gave the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulatory authority to set noise standards
for new aircraft designs.  In 1977 the FAA established three stages of aircraft noise, and set deadlines to guide the airlines in
meeting the (quieter) second-stage noise requirements.   The 1990 Airport Noise and Capacity Act (ANCA) mandated the
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elimination of Stage II aircraft at all U.S. airports by the end of 1999.  Unlike earlier noise regulation, which was non-binding
(i.e., the FAA believes that most carriers would have replaced Stage I aircraft with Stage II aircraft in pursuit of greater fuel
efficiency), the ANCA forces airlines to retire or retrofit roughly 44 percent of their 1990 Stage II aircraft that would have
remained in use after 1999 in the absence of regulation.  
2 Carriers’ decisions of whether to replace or retrofit their planes depend on whether they have an old or new
3
fleet and how well their current fleet is aligned with the markets they currently serve and the markets they plan to serve. 
In cases where planes are retrofitted, it is difficult to obtain precise estimates of the cost of noise regulations because
these costs not only include the cost of the hush kit and installing it, but due to the increased weight on the plane also
           Thus the ANCA has affected aircraft design and generated benefits to homeowners who live in areas affected by airplane
noise, but it has also generated costs to airlines by reducing the economic life of their capital stock.  Surprisingly, analysts have
not addressed the basic question of whether the benefits of the ANCA, arguably the most important piece of airplane noise
regulation to date, exceed its costs.  Our own cost-benefit analysis of the ANCA finds that its $5 billion (present discounted value)
in benefits fall considerably short of its $10 billion costs. 
 More fundamentally, we find that the net benefits that could have been generated even by an economically optimal
airplane noise tax amount to only $0.2 billion (present value).  Just as the ANCA has done, an optimal noise policy would transfer
wealth from airlines and travelers to homeowners—although to a much smaller extent.  It appears that current FAA noise
regulations have generated substantial costs to society when, in fact, there was little justification on efficiency grounds for any
regulatory intervention in the first place.  If policymakers can assure that social regulation rests on a solid analytical foundation,
its critics are all but certain to stop objecting to it on the basis of its cost effectiveness.
The Costs of Noise Regulation
Commercial aircraft have a finite economic and physical life and require replacement at some point.  Noise regulations
can disrupt carriers’ replacement cycle and raise their capital costs if they force carriers to replace a portion of their fleet earlier
than planned.  The costs of regulations are reflected in the accelerated depreciation of affected aircraft.  For example, figure 1
shows that the value of Stage II aircraft, based on a sample of these planes that were built before 1985, declined nearly 20 percent
in the year following the announced phaseout of Stage II aircraft in the fall of 1990.  Aircraft values did not adjust immediately
to the announced phaseout and continued to decline in subsequent years.  It is obviously difficult to infer from this figure precisely
how much the 1990 Airport Noise and Capacity Act, which mandated the phaseout, contributed to the depreciation of the
industry’s Stage II aircraft.  We therefore develop a simple life cycle cost model to estimate the costs that are attributable to the
ANCA.  The model rests on the notion that planes are durable capital goods that have revenue-producing capabilities over time.
Airlines incur a cost in every time period to maintain their existing capital stock.  The effect of the ANCA is to make a portion
of an airline’s capital stock obsolete, thus raising an airline’s cost of maintaining its desired capital stock.
The Model: Carriers can meet the ANCA Stage III requirements by replacing their Stage II aircraft with Stage III aircraft or by
retrofitting their Stage II aircraft with “hush kits” so that they comply with Stage III standards.  It is reasonable to assume that
these costs are comparable because airlines have not revealed a clear preference to retrofit rather than replace.  Our analysis will
therefore be based on a fleet replacement model.  
3 The use of 1990 capital stock figures is appropriate because the ANCA was announced toward the end of
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1990 and the aircraft market probably did not respond until 1991.  If the aircraft market did respond earlier, our cost
estimates would be downward biased because less stock would be affected by the ANCA.  Stage II aircraft represent 46
percent of the planes in our data set, but only 24 percent of the fleet value because they are older and less valuable, on
average, than Stage III planes. 
 Stage II aircraft represented 46 percent of majors and nationals planes and 24 percent of their fleet value.  By
8
maintaining this proportion, we estimate that if Stage II aircraft represented 55 percent of the entire industry’s planes,
they could account for 29 percent of the industry’s fleet value. 
carrier (annual revenue greater than $1 billion) or a national carrier (annual revenue between $100 million and $1 billion).  Data
for each carrier’s fleet were obtained from Back Associates.  The data include the number of aircraft of each type and their year
of manufacture as of December 31 for each year.  The estimated market value of each of these aircraft for each year was obtained
from the Aircraft Appraisal Association of America.  We use these data to provide empirical estimates of the parameters that
determine the cost of the ANCA to the airline industry.
Portion of the capital stock held in Stage II aircraft in 1990:  Based on our data set, we calculate that Stage II aircraft
represented 24 percent of the value of the capital stock of U.S. majors and nationals in 1990.    Because our data set includes only
7
major and national scheduled passenger carriers, it may not accurately reflect the portion of the capital stock held in Stage II
planes for the entire industry, which includes regional carriers, charters, and cargo carriers.  The FAA  (FAA (1995)) estimates
that 55 percent of the planes in the entire industry fleet were Stage II in 1990, which could represent up to 29 percent of the value
of the capital stock according to our estimates.   Thus we use the mid-point 26.5 percent as our base case estimate, and 24 percent
8
to 29 percent as a range for sensitivity purposes.
Total value of the airplane capital stock:  According to our data set, the value of airplanes held by the 30 major and national
carriers operating in 1990 was $75.3 billion (1995 dollars).  These carriers account for a large fraction, but not all of the
industry’s airplane capital stock.  We thus compared the entire industry’s available ton-miles with the available ton-miles
accounted for by the major and national carriers in our sample.  This comparison calls for the value of airplanes in our sample
to be increased 15 percent, which yields an estimate for the entire industry of $86.6 billion (1995 dollars).  This figure may
represent an upper bound to the extent that major and national carriers’ capital stock is more valuable than other carriers’ capital
stock.  A reasonable lower bound estimate would call for the value of airplanes in our sample to be increased 10 percent, which
yields an estimate for the entire industry of $82.8 billion.    We use the average of these two estimates for our base case, $84.7
billion, and the endpoints for sensitivity analysis.
Interest rate:  Because we are analyzing the welfare effects of a public policy, the interest rate should reflect the real social
discount rate, which is equal to the real social opportunity cost of capital.  This cost of capital can be separated into the risk-free
cost of capital and the risk premium.  Although real long-run rates of return on Treasury bonds have averaged close to 3 percent,3.5 percent of the total initial capital stock will remain in Stage II planes in the year 2000.  This capital stock amounts to
$2.99 billion, which according to our model is discounted by carriers over an infinite time horizon and yields a present
discounted cost of $0.70 billion.  In fact, carriers must sell their remaining Stage II aircraft for scrap value in the year
2000.  If they receive no money for the scrapped planes, they will lose the full present discounted value (from the year
2000) of $2.99 billion, which is $1.57 billion.  In this case, our estimate of the cost of the ANCA is understated by $0.87
billion ($1.57 billion - $0.70 billion).  If each of the 2,039 Stage II aircraft we estimate to be in U.S. fleets were sold for
roughly $670,000 in the year 2000, then the carriers would incur a cost from the ANCA roughly equal to what we find
in the base case.  An examination of our data indicates that this figure is reasonably close to aircraft values the year
before they are salvaged, retired, or sold abroad.  Thus. it is unlikely that our estimates of the ANCA are significantly
affected by not explicitly accounting for scrap value.
 As indicated previously, it is difficult to obtain precise estimates of the costs of noise regulations based on the
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cost of retrofitting planes with hush-kits.  Rough estimates of these costs from industry sources based on the cost and
installation of the hush-kit, the extent of aircraft structural modifications and changes in flight operations, and so on
suggest that these costs can easily exceed $10 million per plane.  We do not know when retrofitting would occur, which
makes it difficult to calculate present values, but given that the ANCA requires replacing or retrofitting roughly 1000
aircraft that would remain in service in the absence of regulation, it appears that an estimate of the costs of this
regulation based on the cost of retrofitting would be comparable to our base case estimate of the cost of fleet
replacement.
 We have underestimated the costs of the ANCA because we have not accounted for the fact that the increased
15
costs of acquiring Stage III aircraft generally exceed the value that airlines place on their greater operating efficiency. 
On the other hand, our estimates are hardly affected if we account for travelers’ downward sloping demand curve, which
enables carriers to adjust their output in response to the costs imposed by the  ANCA.  To show this, we first note that
the annual cost of the ANCA over 9.167 years is $1.48 billion.  This translates into an average cost increase per flight of
$204 dollars and a cost mark-up of 1.5 percent ($204/$13,145, where $13,145 is the average cost (in 1995 dollars) of a
flight in 1990 without the ANCA in effect, calculated from data in the Air Transport Association 1996 Annual Report). 
Assuming that average costs equal marginal costs and that travelers’ price elasticity of demand is -0.7 (see Morrison and
Winston (1995)), output would fall 1.1 percent if carriers passed on the marginal cost of the ANCA in higher fares to
travelers.  This would reduce the initial value of the carriers’ capital stock 1.1 percent, which reduces the present value
of the cost of the ANCA to $9.9 billion (1995 dollars).  
Considering the full range of parameter values yields an upper-bound cost estimate of $13.5 billion and a lower-bound cost
estimate of $6.8 billion.   To be sure, the airline industry will raise fares in accordance with the supply and demand elasticities
14
for air travel to recoup some of these losses from air travelers.  Nonetheless, given that the capital losses represent 34 to 54
percent of the initial (1990) value of the airline industry’s Stage II aircraft, and 8 to 12 percent of the industry’s entire aircraft
capital stock, the costs of the ANCA appear to be substantial.
15
The Benefits of Noise Regulation
          Because noise regulations make the residential environment surrounding airports quieter, their benefits are reflected in
higher housing values.  We obtain an estimate of the national benefits of the 1990 Airport Noise and Capacity Act by first
determining the extent to which it has reduced noise and the value that noise reduction adds to affected homes.  We then estimate
how many U.S. households benefit from a more valuable home because of this legislation.   The techniques for evaluating noise levels are discussed at length in Nelson (1982).
16
 Maximum noise levels for Stage III airplanes are 2 to 4 dBA lower than Stage II planes for takeoff, 5 to 8
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dBA lower for sideline (flyover at 450 meters), and 3 to 4 dBA lower for approach.  These figures indicate that
conversion to a Stage III fleet reduces noise in affected areas by 4-5 dBA.  This figure is corroborated by the FAA
Airports Group estimate that the conversion to Stage III planes reduces overall noise levels in affected areas by roughly
5 dBA from what they would have been in the absence of regulation. 
 See, for example, Nelson (1980) and O’Byrne, Nelson and Seneca (1985) for estimates of the value of
18
airport noise reduction in the U.S.  These studies control for the benefits of living near an airport from increased
accessibility.  Similar estimates for Canadian homes are obtained by Levesque (1994) and Uyeno, Hamilton, and Biggs
        Noise is measured in decibels (dB), which are defined on a logarithmic scale.    An increase of 10 dB corresponds to a 1,000
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percent increase in sound intensity and a roughly 200 percent growth in the sensation of loudness.  Weighting scales, such as the
A-scale (dBA), are frequently used to reflect the greater sensitivity of the human ear to certain frequencies.
        The effective perceived noise level (EPNdB) is a measure of noise caused by one aircraft event (takeoff, overhead flight, or
landing) and considers the sound pressure, duration, and tone of the event at a given location.  The Stage I, II, and III
classifications for aircraft are based on measures of the EPNdB from the ground for the take-off, sideline (flyover at 450 meter
distance), and approach of different types of planes.  A Stage II plane cannot exceed a maximum EPNdB of 102 to 108 dBA for
approach (the greatest noise is allowed for the heaviest planes).  To meet Stage III requirements, planes on their approach cannot
exceed 98 to 105 dBA.  Similar requirements are imposed for take-off and sideline noise  (FAA (1992b)).
        Because the noise level at a given location varies during the day, a cumulative measure of the noise level must be determined.
In North America, the most frequently used airport noise index is the day-night sound level (DNL), which aggregates the EPNdBs
of overhead flights during a day at a given location, weighting nighttime flights very heavily (FAA (1992a)).  Typical ambient
noise levels in a residential neighborhood are 44-55 dBA.  Our analysis considers neighborhoods that experience noise levels
above 65 dBA, which are characterized by the FAA as significantly impacted by noise.  The FAA (1985) reports that there are
minimal measurable benefits from noise reductions that occur in areas with noise levels below 65 dBA.  The transition to Stage
III planes as required by the ANCA will lower the noise levels of affected homes by roughly 5 dBA (e.g., homes in the year 2000
that would have been exposed to 70 dBA in the absence of regulation will instead be exposed to 65 dBA).  We will use this
estimate to construct our benefits estimate.  
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         What is the monetary value of this noise reduction?  As noted by Small (1975), the relationship between an externality and
property values should be based on estimates of homeowners’ willingness to pay.  Several authors have used this criteria to
estimate hedonic pricing models of the impact of airport noise on the present value of detached houses.  Their estimates of
homeowners’ willingness to pay range from  0.10-1.60 percent per decibel reduction, with many U.S. estimates in the range of
0.5-0.7 percent.    Because these estimates do not account for the effects of noise on recreational areas or businesses, we will
18(1993). 
 We assume that the benefits of noise reduction are a constant percentage of the value of affected homes, a
19
practice that is standard in the literature.
 Noise exposure maps are from Noise Compatibility Planning Studies submitted to the FAA by airports
20
participating in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 150 Airport Noise Compatibility Program.  FAR Part 150
maintains guidelines for the standardization of submitted maps. 
 If airport traffic increases during the transition period, then the number of houses within the 65 dBA contour
21
is likely to grow because there are more noisy events.  But an offsetting effect is that airlines would be gradually making
a transition to quieter Stage III planes even in the absence of regulation.
  Census tracts were identified using official 1990 census maps from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Housing values
22
were obtained by taking an average of median values of homes in census tracts surrounding an airport, weighted by the
number of affected homes (homes within the 65 dBA noise contour) in each tract.  Median house values were based on
1990 census data, provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
 In keeping with intergovernmental standards, FAR Part 150 Guidelines consider areas with noise levels of 65
23
dBA or higher to be impacted by noise, and do not require noise exposure maps to indicate noise contours below 65
dBA (FAA (1985)).
use a value of 1 percent per decibel (i.e., a 1 decibel reduction in the noise level raises the present value of affected homes by 1
percent).  Given that the ANCA reduces airplane noise by 5 dBA, we assume that its benefits amount to 5 percent of the present
value of affected homes.
19
        We estimate the present value of affected homes from noise exposure maps for 35 major airports, which account for roughly
60 percent of airline operations.    We assume that the number of houses within the 65 dBA noise contour in 1990, which the
20
FAA defines as significant noise exposure, is a reasonable approximation of the number of houses in the year 2000 that would
have been within that contour in the absence of regulation.   The exposure maps are matched with tract-level 1990 census data
21
on median home values, under the assumption that houses are distributed evenly throughout the census tract.   This assumption
22
implies that our benefit estimates are biased upward if houses tend to be built in a quieter part of a census tract.  For each airport,
we calculate the weighted average of median housing values for census tracts that lie wholly or partially within the 65 dBA noise
contour.    We accept long-standing arguments that current housing prices reflect present values because they incorporate the
23
market’s forecast of future developments that might affect these prices.
        In table 2, we summarize the benefits of the ANCA and their components for each airport in our sample and find that the
present value of benefits for the country amounts to roughly $5 billion (1995 dollars).  The national estimate is obtained by
assuming that the proportion of airline operations in the country represented by our sample, 60 percent, is equal to the proportion
of the value of the affected housing stock in the country represented by our sample.  We adjust this estimate to account for the
fact that the average value of a home located near non-sample airports has roughly 81 percent of the value of a home located near This estimate is based on a comparison of the average house price for the “place” where the 35 sample
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airports are located with the average house price for the “place” where 165 non-sample airports are located.  These 200
airports account for nearly all U.S. airline operations.  A place is defined by the 1990 Census as a population center,
usually consisting of at least 1,000 people and identifiable by name.  A metropolitan statistical area consists of at least
one place (often many), usually with a population of at least 50,000.  We used the Census defined place for our analysis
because it is typically a smaller unit than an MSA and offers a more accurate picture of housing values immediately
surrounding the airport.  Our estimate was not perceptibly affected when the average house prices were based on MSAs
instead of places.
 The cost estimates of soundproofing are based on figures supplied by John Driscoll, Executive Director of
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the Los Angeles Airport, and from an unpublished study commissioned to analyze airplane noise at Chicago O’Hare
airport.  Our conclusion is consistent with Gillen (1997), who finds that the costs of soundproofing homes in Denver,
Seattle, and Manchester greatly exceed their benefits.     
 These figures are based on formulae presented in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 150
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guidelines.  A typical Stage II 727-200 departure, for example, constitutes a 100 dBA event at a house beneath the flight
path 5 miles from the airport.  An event (arrival or departure) of this type adds roughly 0.02 dBA to the daily noise level
at that house, considering the possibility that the event may be a more heavily weighted nighttime flight and the fact that
the effective perceived noise levels for arrivals are slightly higher than for departures for a given plane type.   
our sample airports.    The difference in home values arises because major airports, and thus homes in the sample, tend to be
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located in the largest (and most expensive) metropolitan areas in the country.  The ANCA affects the value of roughly $100 billion
of the nation’s housing stock, and provides some 800,000 households with an average benefit of more than $6,000.  But although
these benefits are sizable and widespread, they fall far short of the ANCA’s $10 billion costs, resulting in a cost-benefit ratio of
2:1 and casting considerable doubt on the social desirability of this policy.
An Efficient Solution
         No one doubts that airplane noise is an externality that imposes social costs.  Our assessment, however, indicates that the
Federal Aviation Administration’s approach to correcting this market failure has done more economic harm than good.  But
beyond accurately measuring the costs and benefits of a particular regulation, it is also important to consider whether other
approaches to addressing an acknowledged problem could generate significant economic benefits.  One solution in this case, for
example, might be to allow air carriers to make unconstrained aircraft replacement decisions, but to charge them for the cost of
soundproofing houses that are affected by noise.  This approach, however, does not appear to be promising because the estimated
costs of soundproofing, $25,000-$52,000 per house, significantly exceed the roughly $6,000 in benefits per house from reducing
airplane noise below significant levels.  
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        The economically efficient regulatory solution—the approach that would maximize social net benefits—is to set a Pigouvian
noise tax that eliminates the gap between the private and social marginal costs of airplane flights.  The tax is thus the marginal
cost incurred by homeowners from an additional flight.  To estimate this tax and its welfare effects, it is reasonable to assume
that the typical flight contributes about 0.02 dBA to the daily day-night noise level and about 0.000055 dBA to the annual day-
night noise level.    Because every flight constitutes two events (one departure and one arrival), each flight contributes 0.000055
26 The costs of the ANCA would have been lower if carriers had been given a longer transition time to meet the
29
Stage III requirements.
 Property rights were assigned by a 1962 Supreme Court decision (Griggs v. Allegheny County), which made
30
airport owners liable for noise damages awarded to property owners. 
             The rational behavior of homeowners may also explain why the potential welfare gains from an efficient noise tax are
small.   People often take measures to minimize the cost of externalities without any prodding from the government.  For example,
Calfee and Winston (1998) point out that commuters try to minimize the costs of automobile congestion by living closer to work,
using public transit, commuting during off-peak travel periods, and so on.  In the case of airplane noise, it would be expected that
people who have a high tolerance for noise would be willing to live closer to a flight path and require less compensation, in terms
of lower housing prices, than people who have a low tolerance for noise.
         The ANCA imposed particularly severe costs on carriers because it influenced production decisions ex post, after long-run
investments in Stage II planes had been made.  Thus the overwhelming fraction of the ANCA’s cost to society is incurred in the
value of lost capital investments.    Given the magnitude of these costs, both carriers and homeowners would probably have been
29
better off if air carriers (or airports) had the option to pay homeowners for the right to fly Stage II planes.      
30
The ANCA also took a far too broad-brush approach to airport noise and did not recognize that changes in the air travel
market affect airports in different ways.  For example, in an effort to stimulate airline competition some policymakers are
suggesting that additional take-off and landing slots be made available at Washington’s Reagan National and Chicago’s O’Hare
airports.  This proposal has prompted complaints that airplane noise would increase.  While the complaints are legitimate, current
federal airplane noise regulation is silent on this issue because it simply requires industry fleets to meet Stage III noise
requirements.  
Fundamental Flaws of Social Regulation
            If our assessment of the 1990 Airport Noise and Capacity Act focused just on the benefits  provided to homeowners, it
would be difficult to find fault with the  FAA’s policy toward airplane noise.  But sound public policy must be based on both costs
and benefits, and using this standard it is difficult to justify the ANCA.  Even more fundamentally, the maximum net benefits
that society could accrue from an efficient policy toward airplane noise appear to be quite small.
         These sharp conclusions are illustrative of the flaws of many social regulations.  Hahn and Hird’s (1991) synthesis of
previous assessments of social regulations reveals that most studies tend to offer fragmentary evidence on either costs or benefits,
but not both, and rarely attempt to estimate the net benefits that could be obtained from an optimal policy.   Nonetheless, in areas
such as occupational health and safety, consumer product safety, and drug approvals, the costs of social regulations appear toexceed their benefits.  Because in many cases the gross benefits of even an optimal policy appear small, it is not likely that
significant net benefits could be generated under any circumstances.  The net effects of automobile safety regulations are more
controversial, but even optimal automobile safety regulations would be unlikely to produce large net benefits.  By contrast, both
the costs and benefits of environmental regulations appear to be high, resulting in negligible realized net benefits from current
policies, but suggesting that it might be possible for policy makers to generate sizable net benefits by setting optimal
environmental regulations such as efficient pollution taxes.
             From a political point of view, social regulations may be doing what they are intended to do; that is, the magnitude of
transfers may be a better indicator of a social regulation’s political attractiveness than its efficiency improvements.  But the
political climate may be changing, as evidenced by the current debate over regulatory reform that clearly recognizes that the costs
of many social regulations exceed their benefits.  Still, increasing calls to require proposed regulations to pass a cost-benefit test
fail to address the fundamental weakness of most social regulations.  Even if they pass this test, they may not significantly
improve on the market’s ability to reduce the cost of potential market failure.  A social regulatory policy designed to maximize
net benefits would likely result in far fewer social regulations, but those regulations may gather greater political support and
significantly benefit society.                                                                                                                                                      REFERENCES
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